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Dedicated to providing regular (well, as regular as our workload permits) updates concerning legal and regulatory events impacting the regulation of the business of insurance in the State of California with a particular focus upon the property and casualty and workers' compensation lines.

No Attorney-Client Relationship or Legal Advice

This journal is for general informational purposes only.  By using this journal, you agree that the information herein does not constitute legal or other professional advice and no attorney-client or other relationship is created between you and any of the authors or guest contributors of this journal and/or Barger & Wolen LLP.  This journal should not be considered a substitute for obtaining legal advice from a qualified attorney licensed in your state. The information herein may be changed without notice and is not guaranteed to be complete, correct or up-to-date. The opinions expressed throughout this journal are the opinions of the individual author and/or contributor and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of any other author, contributor or any attorney of Barger & Wolen LLP.

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Friday
14Nov

Insurance Caselaw Roundup (11/14/08)

The following is a list of recent insurance-related opinions issued in California:

Owner Who Could No Longer Work "Hands On" Held not "Totally Disabled" under Disability Policy to Perform Listed Duties of Buyer/ManagerHecht v. Paul Revere Life Insurance Co., ___ Cal. App. 4th __ (2nd App. Dist. Div. 6 11/5/08):  Based upon Erreca v West States Life Ins. Co., 19 Cal. 2d 388 (1942), the trial court ruled that there were no triable issues of fact that appellant was not "totally disabled" to handle duties listed as "buyer/manager/office operations" though plaintiff owner could no longer perform "hands on" work due to chronic pain and lessened strength.  Court of Appeal reviewed de novo and affirmed the trial court's finding.  [Opinion here.]

Return of Premium on Surrendered Bail Bond not Permitted Where Remand was by Trial CourtIndian Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Company v. Alexander, ___ Cal. App. 4th ___ (2nd App. Dist. Div. 8 11/4/08) (holding that insurer and bail bond company was not required to refund premium for bail bond where criminal defendant was remanded to custody by trial court, not bail bond company, for out-of-state warrant).  [Opinion here.]

Non-Arbitrable Question of Whether Claimant for UM Benefits is "Insured" Can Be Addressed by Court in Proceeding Initated by Petition to Compel ArbitrationBouton v. USAA Casualty Insurance Company, __ Cal. App. 4th __ (4th App. Dist. Div. 1 10/7/08):  Appellate court reversed trial court's denial of petition to compel Section 11580.2(f) arbitration of UM benefits.  While trial court denied petition on ground that it sought arbitration of non-aribtrable question of petitioner's status as "insured," appellate court held that trial court could and should have determined this question and that petitioner need not have filed a separate declaratory relief action to ascertain ability to obtain UM benefits.  [Opinion here.]

[Please note that this post does not constitute legal advice and provides only the author's own snapshot view of the cited opinion. No warranties are made as to the accuracy of the author's view of the opinion or as to its legal effect (including, but not limited to, whether it may be subsequently modified, depublished, and/or overruled). The import and applicability of a cited opinion to an actual matter depends upon the specific facts presented and should be reviewed by an attorney. ]


Wednesday
29Oct

CDI Releases Data on Trends in HO and Auto Insurance Fraud

Last week, the CDI posted some data concerning trends in homeowners and auto insurance fraud in response to inquiries regarding the same and its potential link to a slowing economy.  (The CDI's post is here.)

Though the CDI notes that it does not discern a "significant change in trends regarding automobile and homeowners insurance fraud," it is worth noting that the 2008 year is not yet over and there appears to be an uptick in the number of suspicious residential fires reported by insurers from last year.

The CDI also sets forth the number of arrests that the CDI has made for vehicle arsons and homeowners insurance fraud from 2005, which remained level throughout those years and, as for HO fraud in 2008, seemed to drop.  It is questionable, however, how much reliance can be placed upon these "arrest" numbers as reflective of the number of fraudulent claims that may be made upon the industry.  The number of arrests that the CDI may be able to make could, in part, be limited by what resources the CDI may have in conducting its investigation.  These numbers also presume that efforts to make such arrests remained on level throughout that period of time.

The data does not appear to address issues concern suspicious non-arson vehicle claims.  Also, not addressed by the post is whether claim frequency in general goes up in a slow economy.  It would seem logical that in a slow economy, individuals are more apt to make claims, fraudulent or not, as there may be less desire or means to pay for a loss out of pocket.  [If anyone is aware of a study/analysis linking claims frequency with a slowing economy, please let me know, as I would love to see it.]


Wednesday
01Oct

Court Holds that "Safe-Harbor" Doctrine May Be Based on Regulations, Not Just Statutes

Yabsley v. Cingular Wireless, LLC (opinion here) is a must read for companies currently litigating against class UCL lawsuit as it potentially provides a defense that a trial court may have rejected based on prior-existing law.  Yabsley, which will no doubt be the subject of a petition for review to the California Supreme Court and requests for depublication, makes clear that the "safe-harbor" doctrine can be based upon on regulations, as well as statutes, in defense of a UCL claim.
 
For the uninitiated, under the "safe harbor" doctrine, a company may argue that it should be immune from liability under the UCL where the law permits the challenged conduct.  As articulated by the California Supreme Court:
 
"Courts may not simply impose their own notions of the day as to what is fair or unfair.  Specific legislation may limit the judiciary's power to declare [business] conduct unfair.  If the Legislature has permitted certain conduct ... courts may not override that determination.  When specific legislation provides a 'safe harbor,' plaintiffs may not use the general unfair competition law to assault that harbor."

Cel-Tech Comms. Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 182 (1999).
Up until this opinion, however, there has been a great deal of debate as to whether a defendant company can raise a "safe-harbor" defense to a UCL claim based upon regulations that have been promulgated by a governmental agency (not just a statute approved by the California legislature) that permits the alleged unfair act.  This debate primarily stems from the an appellate court's opinion in Krumme v. Mercury Insurance Co., 123 Cal. App. 4th 924 (2004), which has been cited to stand for this proposition.
 
The Yabsley court, however, rejects this limited view of the "safe-harbor" doctrine. In looking at the California Supreme Court's opinion in Cel-Tech, upon which Krumme was based, the Yabsely court held that Cel-Tech only happened to deal with statutes and made no reference to regulations.  "Like the trial court here, we conclude that there is nothing in the Cel-Tech decision purporting to limit the safe harbor doctrine to statues enacted by the Legislature." 
 
The importance of this opinion is particularly heightened in the insurance industry as a great deal of insurer conduct is regulated by regulations promulgated by the Insurance Commissioner under his general powers as set forth by the Insurance Code.  To the extent that the industry can now rely upon regulations, as well as statutes, to demonstrate that they have been engaged in lawfully permitted conduct, the industry has a greater base upon which it can set forth a "safe-harbor" doctrine defense.

[Please note that this post does not constitute legal advice and provides only the author's own snapshot view of the cited opinion. No warranties are made as to the accuracy of the author's view of the opinion or as to its legal effect (including, but not limited to, whether it may be subsequently modified, depublished, and/or overruled). The import and applicability of a cited opinion to an actual matter depends upon the specific facts presented and should be reviewed by an attorney. ]

Thursday
25Sep

California Supreme Court Denies Petition for Review of Medina Decision and Requests for Depublication

As we discussed in a previous post, the Fourth Appellate District issued a very helpful opinion in which it affirmed the trial court's dismissal of an action brought under California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200, which challenged a company's alleged sale of insurance without a license.  (The underlying case, which our office (and yours truly) handled, is entitled Medina v. Safe-Guard Products Int'l, Inc.  The opinion and modification of that opinion can be found here and here, respectively.) 

This opinion is important as it makes clear that insurers cannot be simply sued under the UCL for technical violations of regulatory law without also alleging facts showing that the plaintiff meets the harm-standing requirements of the UCL (i.e., showing that the plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact and lost money or property as a result of the alleged unlawful conduct).

Unsurprisingly, a number of pro-consumer organizations had sought to have this opinion depublished so that it could not be cited in future cases.  Notwithstanding these requests, as well as a petition for review to the California Supreme Court, the California Supreme Court denied these requests and denied the petition for review.  As such, this opinion remains good law.

It should be observed that there has been another recent decision in which the Fourth Appellate District made emphatically clear that allegations of non-compliance with licensing laws, without more, is insufficient for a plaintiff to meet the harm-standing requirements of the UCL.  The second decision is Peterson v. Cellco Partnership.
 
In Peterson, the defendant in that case was alleged to have sold cell phone insurance without a license. Similar to the reasoning it employed in Medina (and another helpful case Hall v. Time), the Peterson court held that "plaintiffs here do not allege they paid more for the insurance due to defendant's collecting a commission.  They do not allege they could have bought the same insurance for a lower price either directly from the insurer or from a licensed agent.  Absent such an allegation, plaintiffs have not shown they suffered actual economic injury.  Rather, they received the benefit of their bargain, having obtained the bargained for insurance at the bargained for price."  The Peterson opinion can be found here.

[Please note that this post does not constitute legal advice and provides only the author's own snapshot view of the cited opinion. No warranties are made as to the accuracy of the author's view of the opinion or as to its legal effect (including, but not limited to, whether it may be subsequently modified, depublished, and/or overruled). The import and applicability of a cited opinion to an actual matter depends upon the specific facts presented and should be reviewed by an attorney. ]
 

Tuesday
16Sep

Insurance Caselaw Roundup (9/16/08)

The following is a list of recent insurance-related opinions issued in California:

Right to Arbitrate UM/UIM Disputes Held Not to be Bar to Wrongful Pre-Arbitration Handling of Claim: Brehm IV v. 21st Century Ins. Co., ___ Cal. App. 4th ___ (2nd App. Dist. Div. 7, 9/16/08) (reversing lower court’s sustaining of demurrer to claimed breach of the implied covenant of good-faith and fair dealing on ground that plaintiff alleged facts demonstrating lack of good faith conduct in resolving claim for UIM benefits and holding that exercising of right to arbitration provided under Cal. Ins. Code 11580.26(b) did not preclude bad-faith claim based upon an insurer’s alleged tortious pre-arbitration handling of the claim). [Opinion here.]

Recoverability of Damages Caused by Driver of Purchased Vehicle under Selling Auto Dealer’s “Garage Operation” Liability Policy: Spangle v. Farmers Insurance Exchange , ___ Cal. App. 4th ___ (2nd App. Dist. 8/29/08) (reversing lower court’s grant of summary judgment against plaintiff on grounds that there was a triable issue of material fact as to whether son of father who purchased a vehicle from dealership was “insured” (as “permissive user”) under dealership’s “garage operations” liability policy and holding that accident caused by son arose from “use” of the car that was covered as a “garage operation”). [Opinion here.]

[ Please note that this post does not constitute legal advice and provides only the author's own snapshot view of the cited opinion. No warranties are made as to the accuracy of the author's view of the opinion or as to its legal effect (including, but not limited to, whether it may be subsequently modified, depublished, and/or overruled). The import and applicability of a cited opinion to an actual matter depends upon the specific facts presented and should be reviewed by an attorney. ]


Tuesday
19Aug

Insurance Caselaw Roundup (8/19/08)

The following is a list of recent insurance-related opinions issued in California this year:

Triggering of Section 11580.2 Coverage: Explorer Insurance Company v. Gonzalez , ___ Cal. App. 4th ___ (3rd App. Dist., July 16, 2008) (holding that tortfeasor was not “underinsured” to trigger underinsurance coverage where injured person’s policy provided coverage up to “$100,000 for all damages from bodily injury sustained by any one person in a single accident” and tortfeasor’s policy provided “combined” coverage up to “$100,000 “for all bodily injury and property damage caused by any single accident.”). [Opinion here.]

Rescission of Annuity Contract & Mistake of Fact: Grenall v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., ___ Cal. App. 4th ___ (1st App. Dist., July 25, 2008) (affirming summary judgment in favor of insurer and holding that purchaser of annuity contract could not rely upon her mistaken belief as to her life expectancy as a “mistake of fact” to rescind annuity contract). [Opinion here.]

Binding Effect of Insured’s Discovery Responses on Insurer in Subrogation Action: Great American Insurance Companies v. Gordon Trucking, Inc. , __ Cal. App. 4th ___ (5th App. Dist., July 29, 2008) (reversing summary judgment entered against insurer on the ground, in part, that insured’s factually devoid discovery responses was not binding on insurer for purposes of summary judgment). [Opinion here.]

Estoppel to Deny Benefits under Commercial Policy: City of Hollister v. Monterey Ins. Co. , ___ Cal. App. 4th ___ (6th App. Dist., July 29, 2008) (affirming judgment against insurer and estopping insurer from relying upon condition precedent to obtaining “functional replacement value” benefit (here, requiring that insured enter into contract to repair or replace a building within 180 days after loss) under commercial policy where insurer determined to have failed to cooperate with insured to comply with condition). [Opinion here.]

[Please note that this post does not constitute legal advice and provides only the author's own snapshot view of the cited opinion. No warranties are made as to the accuracy of the author's view of the opinion or as to its legal effect (including, but not limited to, whether it may be subsequently modified, depublished, and/or overruled). The import and applicability of a cited opinion to an actual matter depends upon the specific facts presented and should be reviewed by an attorney.]


Saturday
02Aug

Have Class Action. Need Plaintiff. No Problem.

No problem, at least, according to counsel representing an uninjured class representative, who will undoubtedly argue that his client, despite having no standing, can nevertheless obtain pre-certification class discovery to obtain the identities of an actual injured class plaintiff to step in.

Let me repeat that.  You might be sued in a class action in California by a plaintiff who is unharmed by you.  While you may be in the process of having a court determine that the plaintiff was never in fact harmed (by way of a motion for summary judgment, which will take at least 4 months to be heard, but typically longer), that plaintiff can seek discovery that may be used to identify an actual injured plaintiff and have that plaintiff substituted in to maintain the class action.

Ridiculous?  Not quite since some of you may have already faced this issue.  It is an issue that regularly comes up, but even more so after the passage of Proposition 64, which suddenly resulted in a number of private attorney general plaintiffs to suddenly lose standing under California’s Unfair Competition Law. 

This issue has also received a "shot in the arm" due to the Court of Appeal’s decision earlier this year in CashCall v. Sup. Ct., 159 Cal. App. 4th 273 (2008), in which such discovery was granted. (In that case, it was alleged that the defendant was secretly recording the telephone conversations of clients without their consent. Despite not having a plaintiff who was actually subject to this alleged illegal conduct, the plaintiffs were granted discovery to identify those individuals who have been surreptitiously recorded so that they could besubstituted into the action.)

So, what does this mean for the industry? 

Well, it has really become another one of the standard issues that your attorney can expect to address in seeking to dispense of a class action lawsuit.   The bright side, however, is that the courts are mindful of the potential abuse of the class action procedure that may arise from the use of a "straw" plaintiff.  If it is the case that the original plaintiff knew or should have reasonably known that he was an inappropriate plaintiff, a court will likely be inclined to deny a request to obtain discovery for a more appropriate plaintiff.  On the other hand, if the facts are more extreme, such as those in CashCall, where no one but the defendant had information as to the identities of injured "victims," a court will be more inclined to grant that discovery. 

[For cases that have denied such discovery, see First American Title Ins. Co. v. Sup. Ct., 146 Cal. App. 4th 1564 (2007), and Cryoport Sys. v. CNA Ins. Cos., 149 Cal. App. 4th 627 (2007), are cases where such discovery has been denied.]